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Every thinker on the site in one table: what a person is, what keeps one the same over time, whether identity is what matters, and whether there is one of you or many.

1600 to 1820 1650 1700 1750 1800 LockeLocke LeibnizLeibniz ButlerButler ReidReid HumeHume KantKant Since 1900 (dashed: living) 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 StrawsonStrawson WilliamsWilliams FrankfurtFrankfurt ShoemakerShoemaker SwinburneSwinburne NozickNozick LewisLewis DennettDennett ParfitParfit KorsgaardKorsgaard DeutschDeutsch MetzingerMetzinger CarrollCarroll TegmarkTegmark
Lifespans, each linked to its page. Filled bars: reductionists. Open bars: further-fact views. Tinted bars: a qualified answer. The Buddhist tradition, Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Simon Saunders and David Wallace, and the writers on uploads are in the table but not on the chart.

The four questions asked on every thinker page. Parfit's answers stay in view for reference.
ThinkerWhat is a person?What makes you the same person over time?Is identity what matters?One of you, or many?
ParfitReductionistNothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.Identity not what mattersNo. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.
The Buddhist no-self viewReductionistThe five aggregates, form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness, and no self over and above them.Nothing strictly: a continuous stream of causally linked events, to which we give one name.Identity not what mattersNo. Clinging to a self is the root of suffering; seeing that there is none is the path to freedom from it.One name for a stream; the question whether there is "really" one is the kind the Buddha set aside.
John LockeReductionist"A thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself" over time. A forensic term.Sameness of consciousness: you are the person whose past actions and experiences you can remember as your own.Identity mattersYes. Reward, punishment and concern for the future all follow personal identity.One. Two consciousnesses in one man would make two persons; one consciousness across two substances, one person.
Gottfried Wilhelm LeibnizFurther factA simple, indivisible substance, a monad, with memory and self-knowledge that make it a moral person.The persistence of the same monad; personal identity also needs the memory and consciousness by which it knows itself.QualifiedPartly. Memory and consciousness are what make survival worth wanting, but the substance is what guarantees it.One. A monad cannot divide, so fission and duplication of a person are impossible.
Joseph Butler and Thomas ReidFurther factA simple, indivisible thinking being, "something that thinks, and acts, and suffers", not its thoughts or acts.Nothing further can be said: identity is simple and undefinable. Memory is evidence of it, never its ground.Identity mattersYes. Without strict identity, responsibility and concern for the future would make no sense.One. A person cannot be divided, and identity admits of no degrees.
David HumeReductionistA bundle or collection of perceptions, succeeding one another and linked by resemblance and causation.Nothing strictly. We feign an identity to smooth over a chain of resembling, causally related perceptions.QualifiedNot as a deep fact. Disputes about identity are largely verbal, once the relations are known.One by convention; the question has no answer beyond the relations among the perceptions.
Immanuel KantQualifiedFor experience, a unity of apperception, the "I think" that can accompany all my representations; in itself, unknown.Theoretical reason cannot say. The identity of consciousness over time does not prove the identity of a substance.QualifiedTheoretically undecidable. Practically, as agents, we must regard ourselves as one and responsible.The unity of consciousness requires one "I" for each experience; whether one substance underlies it, we cannot know.
P. F. StrawsonFurther factA primitive kind of thing to which both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed.Strawson gave no criterion; his persons are embodied, and identified through their bodies.QualifiedThe question does not arise: we cannot describe experiences without ascribing them to persons.One. Experiences are always someone's, and persons are counted as we count bodies.
Bernard WilliamsQualifiedA human being, an embodied creature with a character and a life; persons are not detachable from bodies.Bodily continuity is at least necessary; psychological criteria fail when duplication is possible.Identity mattersYes. My fear of my own future pain cannot be argued away by redescribing what will happen to me.One. Identity cannot be shared, which is why a criterion that allows two candidates must be wrong.
Sydney ShoemakerReductionistA subject of psychological states, which are defined by what they do; persons are realised in brains but not identical with them.Psychological continuity with the right kind of cause, holding in one line, without branching.QualifiedMostly. Shoemaker accepted that fission would preserve what matters, though not identity.One, except in fission, where neither successor is the original but both have what matters.
Harry FrankfurtQualifiedA being with second-order volitions: it can want a particular desire to be the one that moves it to act.Frankfurt did not offer a criterion; his account concerns the structure of a person at a time.QualifiedNot addressed directly. What matters to a person is what it cares about, and caring takes time.One will, though it can be divided against itself, as the unwilling addict's is.
Robert NozickReductionistA self-synthesising being that weighs its own dimensions of continuity, psychological and physical.Being your closest continuer: close enough to you, and closer than any rival.Identity mattersYes, but what counts as closest partly depends on what you care about.One. If two continuers tie, neither is you.
David LewisReductionistA maximal aggregate of person-stages linked by psychological continuity and connectedness: a four-dimensional thing.Psychological continuity and connectedness between its stages, which Lewis called the R-relation.Identity mattersYes. Identity and what matters coincide, provided we count by persons rather than by stages.Before a fission, two persons share one stage; counting by stages gives one, counting by persons two.
Daniel DennettReductionistA centre of narrative gravity: an abstraction, like a centre of gravity, defined by the story a brain tells about itself.Continuity of the self-telling story, carried by whatever hardware sustains it; often there is no further fact.Identity not what mattersNo. The puzzle cases are tests of a useful fiction, and there is no deep fact for them to reveal.Usually one; in odd cases the story can be told two ways, and nothing decides between them.
Richard SwinburneFurther factA pure mental substance, a soul, joined to a body during this life; the soul is the essential part.Nothing that can be analysed: identity is an ultimate, further fact, which memory and bodily continuity are only evidence for.Identity mattersYes. Whether a future person will be me is the most important fact about my future, and it is always determinate.One. A soul cannot divide; after fission at most one successor is the original.
Eric OlsonReductionistA human animal: a biological organism of the species Homo sapiens.Biological continuity: the persistence of the same life, the self-sustaining metabolic processes of one organism.Identity mattersIdentity is a biological fact; what matters to us practically may be psychology, but survival is not.One organism, one of you. In a brain transplant you stay with the body that goes on living.
Marya SchechtmanQualifiedA self-interpreting being whose identity is constituted by a narrative it holds of its own life; later, a being that lives a person life.Inclusion in a self-told narrative of one's life, constrained by the facts and by what others recognise.QualifiedYes, in the practical sense that matters: what is mine is what my narrative takes up.One life, though the story can be revised, and its boundaries are partly set by others.
Christine KorsgaardQualifiedAn agent: a being that must deliberate and choose, and so must regard itself as the author of its actions.Practical unity: the standpoint of an agent pursuing plans over time, which we construct rather than discover.QualifiedYes, practically. Whatever the metaphysics, an agent cannot treat its own future as just another person's.One agent per body, by practical necessity; two minds in one head must still act as one.
Thomas MetzingerReductionistAn organism with a transparent phenomenal self-model; no self exists over and above the model.Nothing deep: the continuity of the self-model, which the brain keeps up and can lose or rebuild.Identity not what mattersNo. There is no self whose identity could matter, only a model whose stability we care about.The question presupposes selves. There is one self-model in a healthy brain; it can be split or extended.
Simon Saunders and David WallaceReductionistA person extended through time in the multiverse, a branching history of stages, on Lewis's model.Psychological and physical continuity along one branch; persons on different branches share their pre-branching stages.Identity mattersYes. Identity is kept, as on Lewis's view, by counting persons rather than stages.Many. Before a measurement, many persons share your present stage; each is uncertain which outcome it will see.
Sean CarrollReductionistA physical system, a pattern in the quantum state of a brain and body, described by the same laws as everything else.Continuity along a branch; after branching there are two people, each with a good claim to the shared past.QualifiedNot deeply. Talk of "the same person" across branches is a convenient convention, useful for planning.Many after each branching. Before you look, you are uncertain which of them you are.
Max TegmarkReductionistA self-aware substructure of the universe, which on his wider view is a mathematical structure.Continuity of conscious experience along a branch.QualifiedIn effect yes: the experiment asks whether "I" will go on experiencing, and treats that as the question.Many. Every quantum event that affects you divides your future between branches.
Uploads and copiesReductionistWhatever the right functional organisation realises: on most views here, a pattern that could run on chips as well as neurons.Disputed. Gradual replacement seems to preserve identity; destructive copying looks like the teletransporter.QualifiedThe case that most forces the question. Parfit's answer: what matters is R, and an upload can have it.As many as you make. Copies running in parallel turn Parfit's division into a policy decision.
David DeutschQualifiedA universal explainer: an entity that can create any explanation there is, by conjecture and criticism.Deutsch offers no theory of personal identity over time, and the site attributes none to him.QualifiedNot addressed. What he stresses is what a person can do, not what keeps one the same.Many. In the multiverse there are fungible instances of each of us, which become different when quantum outcomes are recorded.

Would you press the button?

Four questions from the puzzle cases on the Parfit page. Answer all four to see whose view yours is closest to. The matches are rough: each thinker's answers are our reading of their view, and several would want to qualify them.

1. Would you step into the teletransporter?
2. In the branch-line case, your replica lives on in Mars and you have days to live. Is that nearly as bad as ordinary death?
3. If your brain were divided between two bodies and both operations succeeded, would that be as good as ordinary survival?
4. Does "Is it still me?" always have a yes-or-no answer?

Answer all four questions.