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Compare all views
Every thinker on the site in one table: what a person is, what keeps one the same over time, whether identity is what matters, and whether there is one of you or many.
| Thinker | What is a person? | What makes you the same person over time? | Is identity what matters? | One of you, or many? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parfit | ReductionistNothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. | Identity not what mattersNo. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
| The Buddhist no-self view | ReductionistThe five aggregates, form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness, and no self over and above them. | Nothing strictly: a continuous stream of causally linked events, to which we give one name. | Identity not what mattersNo. Clinging to a self is the root of suffering; seeing that there is none is the path to freedom from it. | One name for a stream; the question whether there is "really" one is the kind the Buddha set aside. |
| John Locke | Reductionist"A thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself" over time. A forensic term. | Sameness of consciousness: you are the person whose past actions and experiences you can remember as your own. | Identity mattersYes. Reward, punishment and concern for the future all follow personal identity. | One. Two consciousnesses in one man would make two persons; one consciousness across two substances, one person. |
| Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz | Further factA simple, indivisible substance, a monad, with memory and self-knowledge that make it a moral person. | The persistence of the same monad; personal identity also needs the memory and consciousness by which it knows itself. | QualifiedPartly. Memory and consciousness are what make survival worth wanting, but the substance is what guarantees it. | One. A monad cannot divide, so fission and duplication of a person are impossible. |
| Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid | Further factA simple, indivisible thinking being, "something that thinks, and acts, and suffers", not its thoughts or acts. | Nothing further can be said: identity is simple and undefinable. Memory is evidence of it, never its ground. | Identity mattersYes. Without strict identity, responsibility and concern for the future would make no sense. | One. A person cannot be divided, and identity admits of no degrees. |
| David Hume | ReductionistA bundle or collection of perceptions, succeeding one another and linked by resemblance and causation. | Nothing strictly. We feign an identity to smooth over a chain of resembling, causally related perceptions. | QualifiedNot as a deep fact. Disputes about identity are largely verbal, once the relations are known. | One by convention; the question has no answer beyond the relations among the perceptions. |
| Immanuel Kant | QualifiedFor experience, a unity of apperception, the "I think" that can accompany all my representations; in itself, unknown. | Theoretical reason cannot say. The identity of consciousness over time does not prove the identity of a substance. | QualifiedTheoretically undecidable. Practically, as agents, we must regard ourselves as one and responsible. | The unity of consciousness requires one "I" for each experience; whether one substance underlies it, we cannot know. |
| P. F. Strawson | Further factA primitive kind of thing to which both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed. | Strawson gave no criterion; his persons are embodied, and identified through their bodies. | QualifiedThe question does not arise: we cannot describe experiences without ascribing them to persons. | One. Experiences are always someone's, and persons are counted as we count bodies. |
| Bernard Williams | QualifiedA human being, an embodied creature with a character and a life; persons are not detachable from bodies. | Bodily continuity is at least necessary; psychological criteria fail when duplication is possible. | Identity mattersYes. My fear of my own future pain cannot be argued away by redescribing what will happen to me. | One. Identity cannot be shared, which is why a criterion that allows two candidates must be wrong. |
| Sydney Shoemaker | ReductionistA subject of psychological states, which are defined by what they do; persons are realised in brains but not identical with them. | Psychological continuity with the right kind of cause, holding in one line, without branching. | QualifiedMostly. Shoemaker accepted that fission would preserve what matters, though not identity. | One, except in fission, where neither successor is the original but both have what matters. |
| Harry Frankfurt | QualifiedA being with second-order volitions: it can want a particular desire to be the one that moves it to act. | Frankfurt did not offer a criterion; his account concerns the structure of a person at a time. | QualifiedNot addressed directly. What matters to a person is what it cares about, and caring takes time. | One will, though it can be divided against itself, as the unwilling addict's is. |
| Robert Nozick | ReductionistA self-synthesising being that weighs its own dimensions of continuity, psychological and physical. | Being your closest continuer: close enough to you, and closer than any rival. | Identity mattersYes, but what counts as closest partly depends on what you care about. | One. If two continuers tie, neither is you. |
| David Lewis | ReductionistA maximal aggregate of person-stages linked by psychological continuity and connectedness: a four-dimensional thing. | Psychological continuity and connectedness between its stages, which Lewis called the R-relation. | Identity mattersYes. Identity and what matters coincide, provided we count by persons rather than by stages. | Before a fission, two persons share one stage; counting by stages gives one, counting by persons two. |
| Daniel Dennett | ReductionistA centre of narrative gravity: an abstraction, like a centre of gravity, defined by the story a brain tells about itself. | Continuity of the self-telling story, carried by whatever hardware sustains it; often there is no further fact. | Identity not what mattersNo. The puzzle cases are tests of a useful fiction, and there is no deep fact for them to reveal. | Usually one; in odd cases the story can be told two ways, and nothing decides between them. |
| Richard Swinburne | Further factA pure mental substance, a soul, joined to a body during this life; the soul is the essential part. | Nothing that can be analysed: identity is an ultimate, further fact, which memory and bodily continuity are only evidence for. | Identity mattersYes. Whether a future person will be me is the most important fact about my future, and it is always determinate. | One. A soul cannot divide; after fission at most one successor is the original. |
| Eric Olson | ReductionistA human animal: a biological organism of the species Homo sapiens. | Biological continuity: the persistence of the same life, the self-sustaining metabolic processes of one organism. | Identity mattersIdentity is a biological fact; what matters to us practically may be psychology, but survival is not. | One organism, one of you. In a brain transplant you stay with the body that goes on living. |
| Marya Schechtman | QualifiedA self-interpreting being whose identity is constituted by a narrative it holds of its own life; later, a being that lives a person life. | Inclusion in a self-told narrative of one's life, constrained by the facts and by what others recognise. | QualifiedYes, in the practical sense that matters: what is mine is what my narrative takes up. | One life, though the story can be revised, and its boundaries are partly set by others. |
| Christine Korsgaard | QualifiedAn agent: a being that must deliberate and choose, and so must regard itself as the author of its actions. | Practical unity: the standpoint of an agent pursuing plans over time, which we construct rather than discover. | QualifiedYes, practically. Whatever the metaphysics, an agent cannot treat its own future as just another person's. | One agent per body, by practical necessity; two minds in one head must still act as one. |
| Thomas Metzinger | ReductionistAn organism with a transparent phenomenal self-model; no self exists over and above the model. | Nothing deep: the continuity of the self-model, which the brain keeps up and can lose or rebuild. | Identity not what mattersNo. There is no self whose identity could matter, only a model whose stability we care about. | The question presupposes selves. There is one self-model in a healthy brain; it can be split or extended. |
| Simon Saunders and David Wallace | ReductionistA person extended through time in the multiverse, a branching history of stages, on Lewis's model. | Psychological and physical continuity along one branch; persons on different branches share their pre-branching stages. | Identity mattersYes. Identity is kept, as on Lewis's view, by counting persons rather than stages. | Many. Before a measurement, many persons share your present stage; each is uncertain which outcome it will see. |
| Sean Carroll | ReductionistA physical system, a pattern in the quantum state of a brain and body, described by the same laws as everything else. | Continuity along a branch; after branching there are two people, each with a good claim to the shared past. | QualifiedNot deeply. Talk of "the same person" across branches is a convenient convention, useful for planning. | Many after each branching. Before you look, you are uncertain which of them you are. |
| Max Tegmark | ReductionistA self-aware substructure of the universe, which on his wider view is a mathematical structure. | Continuity of conscious experience along a branch. | QualifiedIn effect yes: the experiment asks whether "I" will go on experiencing, and treats that as the question. | Many. Every quantum event that affects you divides your future between branches. |
| Uploads and copies | ReductionistWhatever the right functional organisation realises: on most views here, a pattern that could run on chips as well as neurons. | Disputed. Gradual replacement seems to preserve identity; destructive copying looks like the teletransporter. | QualifiedThe case that most forces the question. Parfit's answer: what matters is R, and an upload can have it. | As many as you make. Copies running in parallel turn Parfit's division into a policy decision. |
| David Deutsch | QualifiedA universal explainer: an entity that can create any explanation there is, by conjecture and criticism. | Deutsch offers no theory of personal identity over time, and the site attributes none to him. | QualifiedNot addressed. What he stresses is what a person can do, not what keeps one the same. | Many. In the multiverse there are fungible instances of each of us, which become different when quantum outcomes are recorded. |
Would you press the button?
Four questions from the puzzle cases on the Parfit page. Answer all four to see whose view yours is closest to. The matches are rough: each thinker's answers are our reading of their view, and several would want to qualify them.
Answer all four questions.