Philosophy and futurism, from about 2000
Uploads and copies
Scan a brain in enough detail and run the result on a computer. If the program thinks your thoughts, is it you? And if it can be copied, which copy?
The view
Mind uploading means making a working copy of a particular person's mind on a computer, by scanning the brain in enough detail to reproduce its activity. No one knows how to do it, and some doubt it can be done. But if the mind is a matter of the brain's functional organisation, it is possible in principle, and it turns Parfit's thought experiments into engineering questions.
David Chalmers, in "The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis" (2010), set out the options. In destructive uploading, the brain is scanned layer by layer and destroyed in the process, and the upload is built from the record: the teletransporter again. In gradual uploading, neurons are replaced one at a time by functionally identical chips, over months, while the person stays conscious throughout. In nondestructive uploading the original survives beside the upload: the Branch-Line Case. Chalmers argued that gradual uploading is the safest bet for survival, since at no step does anything seem to be lost, and that if gradual uploading preserves identity, it is hard to see why destructive uploading should not.
The argument
Robin Hanson's The Age of Em (2016) imagines the economics. Once brains can be emulated, emulations can be copied as easily as files. A skilled worker might be copied thousands of times; copies might run for a day and be deleted, or be merged; whole lives would be lived at different speeds. In such a world, the question "which copy is me?" is not occasional and imaginary but constant, and every person faces Parfit's division as a matter of daily policy.
An ordinary brain.
Where it meets Parfit
Parfit's view gives the clearest answer. If what matters is Relation R, with any cause, then an upload that carries your memories, character and plans has what matters, whether it was made gradually or at once. If two uploads are made, each has it, and it does not matter that neither is you. Parfit's teletransporter was the template for most of this discussion, and Chalmers sets his own analysis beside Parfit's.
Where it parts from Parfit
Copies running in parallel raise questions Parfit treated only briefly: how to weigh the interests of many successors, whether merging is like death, and whether deleting a copy that has run for a day is killing someone. And some writers on uploading reject his view, holding that only gradual replacement keeps the original alive, or that an upload would not be conscious at all. The mind site sets out Chalmers's views on consciousness.
| Uploads | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | Whatever the right functional organisation realises: on most views here, a pattern that could run on chips as well as neurons. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Disputed. Gradual replacement seems to preserve identity; destructive copying looks like the teletransporter. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | The case that most forces the question. Parfit's answer: what matters is R, and an upload can have it. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | As many as you make. Copies running in parallel turn Parfit's division into a policy decision. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
Further reading
- David J. Chalmers, "The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis", Journal of Consciousness Studies (2010).
- Robin Hanson, The Age of Em: Work, Love and Life when Robots Rule the Earth (2016).
- Susan Schneider and others, in Science Fiction and Philosophy, edited by Susan Schneider (2nd edn, 2016).