Terms

Glossary

The words the debate about personal identity is conducted in, defined briefly and linked to the pages where they matter.

Animalism
The view that each of us is a human animal, an organism that persists as long as its life goes on, whatever happens to its psychology. See: Olson.
Anattā (not-self)
The Buddhist teaching that no self exists apart from the five aggregates of bodily and mental events. See: the Buddhist no-self view.
Branch-Line Case
Parfit's variant of the teletransporter in which the original survives the scan, damaged, and dies a few days later while the replica lives on Mars. See: Parfit, section 2, Nozick.
Born rule
The rule that the probability of a quantum outcome is the squared size of its amplitude. In Everett's theory, explaining why it should guide expectation is the problem of probability. See: Many of you, section 3, Carroll.
Cartesian ego
A separately existing, purely mental subject of experiences, distinct from the brain and body. Parfit's main target. See: Parfit, section 1, Swinburne.
Closest continuer
Nozick's theory that a later person is you if they continue you closely enough and nothing else continues you as closely. See: Nozick.
Combined spectrum
Parfit's range of cases from no change at all to the complete replacement of your body and psychology, used to show that identity can be indeterminate. See: Parfit, section 4.
Connectedness
The holding of direct psychological links, such as memories, intentions carried out and lasting beliefs and desires. It comes in degrees. See: Parfit, section 5.
Continuity
The holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness. It is transitive where connectedness is not. See: Parfit, section 5, Butler and Reid.
Division
Parfit's case in which each half of a brain is transplanted into a new body and both people survive. See: Parfit, section 3.
Empty question
A question that has no answer even when all the facts are known, as "is it the same club?" may have none. Parfit holds that "is it still me?" can be one. See: Parfit, section 4.
Everett's theory
The interpretation of quantum mechanics without collapse, on which every outcome of a measurement happens and observers come to exist in many versions. See: Many of you, section 1, the reality site.
Fission
Any case in which one person is followed by two or more, each psychologically continuous with the original. See: Lewis, Many of you.
Fungible
Identical in every respect, so that the instances are not distinct things in any meaningful sense. Deutsch's word for the instances of an object in the multiverse before they become different. See: Many of you, section 1, Deutsch.
Further fact
A fact about personal identity over and above the facts about brains, bodies and experiences, such as the persistence of a soul. See: Parfit, section 1, Swinburne.
Identity
Numerical identity: being one and the same thing, as opposed to qualitative identity, being exactly alike. Two replicas can be qualitatively identical without being numerically identical. See: Parfit.
Memory criterion
The theory that a past person is you if you can remember their experiences or actions as your own. See: Locke, Butler and Reid.
Narrative self-constitution
Schechtman's view that a person constitutes their identity by understanding their life as a story. See: Schechtman.
Perdurance (temporal parts)
The view that things persist by having different parts, or stages, at different times. Lewis's account of fission depends on it. See: Lewis, Many of you, section 2.
Person
For Locke, a thinking being that can consider itself as itself over time; for Frankfurt, a being with second-order volitions; for Deutsch, a universal explainer. See: Many of you, section 5.
Quasi-memory
An apparent memory caused in the right way by a past experience, whoever had it. Ordinary memory is quasi-memory of one's own past. See: Shoemaker.
Quantum immortality
The claim that in Everett's multiverse each of us always survives in some branch. Tegmark doubts it; Lewis feared it. See: Many of you, section 4, Tegmark.
Reductionism
Parfit's view that a person's existence consists in nothing more than the existence of a brain and body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. See: Parfit.
Relation R
Psychological connectedness and continuity, with any cause. Parfit's answer to what matters in survival. See: Parfit, section 5.
Self-model
The brain's representation of the organism as a whole. Metzinger holds that there are self-models but no selves. See: Metzinger.
Self-locating uncertainty
Uncertainty about where or who in the world one is, when everything else is known. Carroll's basis for probability in Everett's theory. See: Carroll.
Teletransporter
Parfit's imagined machine that scans and destroys a person on Earth and builds an exact replica on Mars. See: Parfit, section 2, Uploads and copies.
Universal explainer
Deutsch's term for a person: an entity that can create any explanation there is. See: Deutsch, Many of you, section 5.
Wanton
Frankfurt's term for a creature with desires but no second-order volitions, and so not a person. See: Frankfurt.