Stockholm and MIT, born 1967

Max Tegmark

Sit in front of a gun wired to a quantum coin. In every round there is a branch in which it clicks and you live. Max Tegmark proposed the experiment to tell Everett's theory from its rivals, and then argued that it does not make anyone immortal.

A small rowing boat carries a standing white-shrouded figure and a coffin across dark water towards a rocky island of tall cypresses and tomb-like openings in the cliffs
Arnold Böcklin, Isle of the Dead, first version, 1880. Kunstmuseum Basel. Böcklin painted the crossing five times. On the quantum-immortality argument, some version of the passenger never arrives.Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The view

In a paper of 1997, "The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?", Max Tegmark described an experiment to test Everett's theory from the inside. A gun is wired to a device that measures the spin of a particle. If the spin is up, the gun fires; if down, it only clicks. The experimenter sits in front of it and pulls the trigger again and again.

On a one-world interpretation he hears a click about half the time, and soon dies. On Everett's theory, in every round there is a branch in which he survives, and only those branches contain anyone to hear anything. So, from the experimenter's own point of view, Everett's theory predicts an unbroken run of clicks, however long he continues. Anyone else watching would see him die in most branches. Only the experimenter could learn the truth, and he could not tell anyone who had not shared his luck.

The argument

Does it follow that, if Everett is right, each of us is immortal, since in some branch we always survive? Tegmark argues not. The experiment needs death to be sudden and binary, decided by a single quantum event, so that every branch contains either a fully conscious experimenter or a dead one. Real deaths are not like that. Most come gradually, through illness, ageing or injury, by way of states of diminished consciousness. There is no guarantee of a branch in which you remain fully yourself, and so no promise of immortality.

With sudden death, every surviving branch has a whole experimenter in it. With gradual decline, most surviving branches do not.

Where he meets Parfit

Tegmark, like Parfit, is a reductionist: there is no soul to be preserved, and survival is a matter of the continuation of conscious, connected experience. His own reason for rejecting quantum immortality, that what survives in the rare branches may not be much of a person, is close to Parfit's thought that what matters comes in degrees.

Where he parts from Parfit

The experiment treats "will I go on experiencing?" as the question that matters. Parfit's view dissolves it. If identity is not what matters, the experimenter should not ask whether some successor will hear a click, but how much of what matters there will be, in branches of what weight. On that measure each round halves his future, and the experiment is a disaster however it seems from inside. The Many of you page sets out this reading, and Lewis's darker one. Tegmark's mathematical universe has a page on the reality site.

Tegmark and Parfit side by side
TegmarkParfit
What is a person?A self-aware substructure of the universe, which on his wider view is a mathematical structure.Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
What makes you the same person over time?Continuity of conscious experience along a branch.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.
Is identity what matters?In effect yes: the experiment asks whether "I" will go on experiencing, and treats that as the question.No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.
One of you, or many?Many. Every quantum event that affects you divides your future between branches.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.

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Further reading