Boston, Oxford and Tufts, 1942–2024
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett's brain sits in a vat in Houston while his body defuses a warhead underground in Oklahoma, linked by radio. He tries to say where he is, and finds the question harder than it looks.
The view
"Where Am I?" (1978), one of Daniel Dennett's best-known pieces, is a story told in the first person. Dennett is asked by the Pentagon to recover a radioactive warhead lodged deep under Tulsa, Oklahoma. Since radiation would damage his brain, surgeons remove it and keep it alive in a vat in Houston, linked by radio to every nerve in his body. He looks at his own brain in the vat and wonders why he cannot make himself feel that he is "here", in the vat, rather than "there", looking at it.
Then the body is lost in the mine, and his point of view goes dark. He is given a new body. Later he learns that a computer, Hubert, has been running a perfect copy of his brain's program in parallel, and that a switch lets him move the body's control from one to the other. Which of them is he? At the end, the switch is flipped, and a second voice begins to speak.
The argument
The story is designed to show that the questions "where am I?" and "which one is me?" have no answer beyond the facts it describes. Dennett's later account of the self, as a "centre of narrative gravity", makes the point positive. A centre of gravity is not a thing in an object, but it is a useful and perfectly real abstraction. A self is the same kind of thing: the centre of the story a brain tells about the body it controls. When the story can be told two ways, nothing further decides which is right.
Where he meets Parfit
Both deny the further fact and both are happy to say that some identity questions are empty. Dennett's story is a teletransporter tale in all but name, and his conclusion, that our sense of being located somewhere is a product of the brain's modelling, fits Parfit's view that nothing hidden is at stake.
Where he parts from Parfit
Dennett treats the self as a useful fiction, a theorist's abstraction, where Parfit thinks persons are real but not separately existing. Parfit gave a positive account, Relation R, of what matters; Dennett was more interested in why the brain constructs a self at all. The mind site and the free will site are both built around Dennett's views.
| Dennett | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | A centre of narrative gravity: an abstraction, like a centre of gravity, defined by the story a brain tells about itself. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Continuity of the self-telling story, carried by whatever hardware sustains it; often there is no further fact. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | No. The puzzle cases are tests of a useful fiction, and there is no deep fact for them to reveal. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | Usually one; in odd cases the story can be told two ways, and nothing decides between them. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
Further reading
- Daniel C. Dennett, "Where Am I?", in Brainstorms (1978), also reprinted in Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett (eds), The Mind's I (1981).
- Daniel C. Dennett, "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity" (1992).
- Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), chapter 13.