Oxford, 1919–2006
P. F. Strawson
The thing that weighs ten stone and the thing that is thinking hard are not two things, a body and a mind, but one: a person. P. F. Strawson argued that this concept is basic, and cannot be built from anything simpler.
The view
In Individuals (1959), P. F. Strawson asked how we pick out and refer to the things in our world. His third chapter, "Persons", asked why we ascribe states of consciousness to anything at all, and why to the very same thing to which we ascribe a height, a weight and a position. His answer was that the concept of a person is primitive: a person is a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing bodily characteristics apply to a single individual of that type.
He called the first kind P-predicates, such as "is smiling", "is going for a walk", "is in pain", "is thinking hard" and "believes in God". The second kind, M-predicates, are those we could also apply to material bodies: "weighs ten stone", "is in the drawing-room". A person is not a mind attached to a body. It is one thing of which both kinds are true.
The argument
Strawson argued against two rivals. The Cartesian makes the person two things, an ego and a body, and so cannot explain how we ever ascribe experiences to anyone else, since others' egos are hidden. The "no-ownership" theorist says experiences belong to no one, only causally to a body. Both fail, Strawson argued, for the same reason: it is a condition of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself that one be able to ascribe them to others, and that requires that they be ascribed to things that can be identified, which means embodied persons.
Where does each predicate belong?
Where he meets Parfit
Strawson rejected the Cartesian ego, the separately existing subject that Parfit also rejects. Neither thinks that a person is a soul hidden behind a body; both think persons are not something over and above the world of bodies and their histories.
Where he parts from Parfit
Strawson's persons are basic, not reducible. Parfit claims that the facts about a person's life could in principle be described impersonally, without saying that anyone has the experiences. Strawson's argument says that we cannot even identify experiences except as someone's, so the impersonal description is not available to us. Parfit discussed the objection and replied that the dependence is conceptual, not metaphysical: we may need the concept of a person to identify experiences, without persons being anything more than their brains, bodies and experiences.
His son Galen Strawson writes on the self and on free will; the free will site has a page on him, and a page on P. F. Strawson's account of moral responsibility.
| Strawson | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | A primitive kind of thing to which both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Strawson gave no criterion; his persons are embodied, and identified through their bodies. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | The question does not arise: we cannot describe experiences without ascribing them to persons. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | One. Experiences are always someone's, and persons are counted as we count bodies. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
Further reading
- P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959), chapter 3, "Persons".
- Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), Part Three, on whether persons are separately existing entities.