North India, from the time of the Buddha
The Buddhist no-self view
The Buddha taught that there is no self to be found in a person, only a stream of passing physical and mental events. Twenty-four centuries later, Parfit read the texts and found his own view in them.
The view
The Buddha taught in north India, probably in the fifth century BC. Among the marks he found in everything that exists is anattā, not-self. Look at what a person is made of, and you find five groups of events, the aggregates: bodily form, feeling, perception, mental formations such as intentions and habits, and consciousness. Each is changing and none is a self. There is no further owner behind them who has the experiences, and no unchanging core that passes from childhood to old age.
The best-known statement comes in a later text, the Milindapañha, the questions of King Milinda, a Greek king who ruled in the north-west of India in the second century BC. The king asks the monk Nāgasena who he is. Nāgasena replies that "Nāgasena" is only a name: there is no person to be found under it. The king objects, and Nāgasena asks him how he came. By chariot. Then what is the chariot? Is it the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body, the yoke? It is none of these, and nothing apart from them. "Chariot" is a word used for these parts when they are put together in a certain way. So it is with a person.
In the fifth century AD the commentator Buddhaghosa put the doctrine in a form Parfit quoted: there is suffering, but no one who suffers; there is action, but no doer.
The argument
The argument is not mainly theoretical. Craving and clinging, on the Buddha's diagnosis, rest on the belief in a self that must be protected and gratified. Seeing that the belief is false loosens its grip, and with it the suffering it causes. The teaching on rebirth raised an obvious question: if there is no self, what is reborn? Nāgasena answers with a lamp that lights another. The second flame is neither the same as the first nor wholly different. It is continuous with it, and that is all.
A chariot. Which part is the chariot?
Where it meets Parfit
Parfit added an appendix to Reasons and Persons quoting the Milindapañha and Buddhaghosa, and remarked that the Buddha would have agreed with the Reductionist View. The agreement is real. Both say that a person exists only as a body and a stream of events, that the facts can be described impersonally, and that seeing this changes how one feels about one's own future and death. Parfit's glass tunnel, whose walls disappeared, is close to what the Buddhist texts describe as release from clinging.
Where it parts from Parfit
The Buddhist view is a path, not a theory of survival. It does not ask what makes a future person me, and it puts the impersonal truth to work in a programme of practice and liberation that Parfit did not share. It also includes rebirth, a continuity across lives that has no place in his account. And some Buddhist schools held that the person, though not ultimately real, is not simply nothing either, a qualification nearer to Parfit's "conventional" persons than to outright denial.
| The Buddhists | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | The five aggregates, form, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness, and no self over and above them. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Nothing strictly: a continuous stream of causally linked events, to which we give one name. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | No. Clinging to a self is the root of suffering; seeing that there is none is the path to freedom from it. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | One name for a stream; the question whether there is "really" one is the kind the Buddha set aside. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
Further reading
- Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), appendix J, "Buddha's View".
- Mark Siderits, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons (2003), a careful comparison of the two traditions.
- Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (1982), on the doctrine in the early Pali texts.
- Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.