Yale and Princeton, 1929–2023

Harry Frankfurt

Many animals want things. Only persons, Harry Frankfurt argued, can want to want them, or want not to. A person is a creature who can care which of its desires moves it.

A household in chaos: a woman asleep on a step with a pipe, children feeding a cat and stealing from her purse, a parrot drinking wine, and a man in the background fondling a maid
Jan Steen, The Effects of Intemperance, c. 1663–65. National Gallery, London. A house given over to whatever anybody wants next. Frankfurt's wanton has desires, but no view about which of them should win.Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The view

In "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (1971), Harry Frankfurt distinguished first-order desires, desires to do or have something, from second-order desires, desires about one's own desires. A second-order volition is a second-order desire of a special kind: wanting a certain first-order desire to be the one that actually moves you. Persons, Frankfurt argued, are distinguished by having second-order volitions. A creature with desires but no second-order volitions he called a wanton.

His example is addiction. The unwilling addict wants the drug and wants not to want it; he identifies with the second desire and is moved, against his will, by the first. The wanton addict wants the drug and has no view about the wanting; he is not a person in Frankfurt's sense, whatever species he belongs to. The willing addict wants the drug and wants to want it, and takes it of his own free will.

The argument

The account explains why freedom of the will is a problem only for persons. An animal can be free to do what it wants, but only a person can have the will it wants to have. Most of Frankfurt's later work developed the idea of caring: what a person cares about gives its life a shape, and it cannot simply decide what to care about.

The same first-order desires in all three. What differs is the level above.

Where he meets Parfit

Both define persons by psychology, not by species or substance. On Frankfurt's account a human being might fail to be a person and a non-human might succeed, and the same is implicit in Parfit's Reductionism. Frankfurt's interest in what we care about also bears on Parfit's question: if what matters is R, part of what R carries forward is the structure of a person's cares.

Where he parts from Parfit

Frankfurt answered a different question. He asked what a person is at a time, not what makes a person the same over time, and his account says nothing about teletransporters or division. Where Parfit's view loosens the ties of self-interest, Frankfurt's makes the self's own commitments central to its being a person at all. His account is one of the three criteria in the "Who counts?" figure, and the free will site sets out his compatibilism and the Frankfurt cases.

Frankfurt and Parfit side by side
FrankfurtParfit
What is a person?A being with second-order volitions: it can want a particular desire to be the one that moves it to act.Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
What makes you the same person over time?Frankfurt did not offer a criterion; his account concerns the structure of a person at a time.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.
Is identity what matters?Not addressed directly. What matters to a person is what it cares about, and caring takes time.No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.
One of you, or many?One will, though it can be divided against itself, as the unwilling addict's is.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.

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Further reading