Mainz, born 1958
Thomas Metzinger
There are no such things as selves, Thomas Metzinger argues. There is a model of a self, built by the brain, and the model is transparent: we look straight through it and take it for the thing itself.
The view
In Being No One (2003) and the shorter The Ego Tunnel (2009), the philosopher Thomas Metzinger sets out the self-model theory of subjectivity. The brain builds a model of the organism it belongs to: its body, its position in space, its thoughts and its relation to the world. The model is what he calls transparent: the brain cannot recognise it as a model, any more than you see the pixels of a screen when you watch a film. So the organism experiences itself as a self, directly present, and not as a representation.
On this view nobody has ever been or had a self. There are self-models, and organisms that have them, and nothing else that the word "self" could pick out. The sense of being someone, of ownership and of being the one who acts, is a feature of the model.
The argument
Metzinger draws on experiments in which the self-model can be bent. In the rubber hand illusion, discovered in 1998, a person watches a rubber hand being stroked while their own hidden hand is stroked in time. Within minutes, many feel the touch in the rubber hand and feel that it is theirs. Out-of-body experiences, which can be induced in the laboratory with virtual reality, show the felt location of the self moving outside the body. If ownership and location can be reassigned like this, they are not facts about a self but properties of a model.
Your real hand is hidden behind the screen. You watch the rubber hand.
Where he meets Parfit
Both deny the further fact, and both think that seeing through it can change how one lives. Metzinger has written of this as a kind of liberation, close in spirit to Parfit's glass tunnel and to the Buddhist no-self view that Parfit set beside his own.
Where he parts from Parfit
Metzinger goes further. Parfit's persons are real, though not separately existing; Metzinger's selves do not exist at all. And the two start from different places: Parfit from conceptual analysis and imagined cases, Metzinger from neuroscience and the actual ways in which self-experience breaks down. The mind site sets out his theory of consciousness in full.
| Metzinger | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | An organism with a transparent phenomenal self-model; no self exists over and above the model. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Nothing deep: the continuity of the self-model, which the brain keeps up and can lose or rebuild. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | No. There is no self whose identity could matter, only a model whose stability we care about. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | The question presupposes selves. There is one self-model in a healthy brain; it can be split or extended. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |
Further reading
- Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2003).
- Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self (2009).
- Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, "Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see", Nature (1998).