Oberlin, Los Angeles and Princeton, 1941–2001

David Lewis

Two roads can share a stretch of tarmac before they part at a fork. David Lewis argued that in a fission case two persons share their early stages in the same way, so identity and what matters never come apart.

A straight country road runs towards the horizon between two rows of tall, thin, bare-trunked trees, with a man and his dog walking down it and side roads branching off
Meindert Hobbema, The Avenue at Middelharnis, 1689. National Gallery, London. One road, with others leaving it to either side. Lewis's persons are like roads: they can share a stretch before they part.Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The view

David Lewis held that ordinary things, persons included, persist through time by having temporal parts, as a road extends through space by having stretches. A person is a whole made of person-stages, each existing at a time, and linked by what Lewis, following Parfit, called the R-relation: psychological continuity and connectedness. In "Survival and Identity" (1976) he accepted Parfit's account of what matters in survival. What he denied was Parfit's conclusion that identity is not what matters.

The difficulty is fission. If a brain is divided and each half sustains a person, the two later persons are R-related to the earlier one, yet they cannot both be identical with it. Lewis's answer was that there were two persons all along. Before the division, they shared all their stages, as two roads that later fork share every stretch up to the fork. After it, each person continues with stages of its own. Each later person is identical with an earlier person, and nothing that matters has been lost.

The argument

The view has a cost, and Lewis faced it. Before the fission, how many people are in the room? If we count by identity, two; but they share a body, a brain and every thought. Lewis proposed that in ordinary speech we count by stages, by what he called tensed identity, which is why we say "one". The overcount is harmless, since in ordinary life the two ways of counting agree. He also discussed persons who live so long, like Methuselah, that their early and late stages are only weakly connected, and asked whether such a being is one person or a series.

Two roads, one stretch of tarmac. The same picture appears on the Many of you page.

Where he meets Parfit

On what matters they agree completely. Survival is a matter of psychological continuity and connectedness, with any cause, and it can come in degrees. Fission is no worse than ordinary survival. Lewis's paper is an attempt to keep Parfit's account of what matters while denying his most startling claim.

Where he parts from Parfit

Parfit replied that Lewis's view makes the number of persons now present depend on what will happen later, and asked whether a person who knows he will divide should regard himself as two. He thought the redescription changed nothing that matters, which was his point: if identity can be kept only by rearranging how we count, identity is not what does the work. The dispute was taken into quantum physics by Simon Saunders and David Wallace, and Lewis himself wrote on the multiverse at the end of his life; see quantum immortality.

Lewis and Parfit side by side
LewisParfit
What is a person?A maximal aggregate of person-stages linked by psychological continuity and connectedness: a four-dimensional thing.Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
What makes you the same person over time?Psychological continuity and connectedness between its stages, which Lewis called the R-relation.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.
Is identity what matters?Yes. Identity and what matters coincide, provided we count by persons rather than by stages.No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.
One of you, or many?Before a fission, two persons share one stage; counting by stages gives one, counting by persons two.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.

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Further reading