Königsberg, 1724–1804
Immanuel Kant
Kant agreed with Hume that introspection reveals no soul. But he thought the unity of experience requires an "I" all the same: not a thing we find, but a form every thought must take.
The view
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781; second edition 1787), Kant argued that the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations. Unless every perception could be taken up into one consciousness, there would be no experience of an ordered world at all, only a scatter of impressions belonging to no one. This unity, which he called the transcendental unity of apperception, is a condition of experience, not something we find in it.
But a formal unity is not a substance. In the section on the paralogisms, the fallacies of rational psychology, Kant showed that from the unity of the "I think" nothing follows about a simple, persisting soul. The third paralogism concerns personality: from the fact that I am conscious of my identity through time, the rationalists inferred that I am the same substance through time. The inference fails. The identity of consciousness is only the formal identity of a point of view.
The argument
To show that the inference fails, Kant offered a thought experiment, in a footnote to the third paralogism. An elastic ball that strikes another squarely passes on its whole motion, its whole state. Now imagine substances, each of which passes on its representations, together with the consciousness of them, to the next. The last would be conscious of all the states of those before it, as its own, without being the same substance as any of them. For all introspection can tell us, that may be what happens in us.
The first ball carries a state: memories, plans, a point of view.
Where he meets Parfit
Kant's balls are a transfer case, the teletransporter in eighteenth-century dress, and Kant draws the conclusion Parfit would: introspection cannot tell continuity of consciousness from continuity of substance. Both deny that we have any insight into a persisting soul.
Where he parts from Parfit
Kant did not think the self was a bundle. The unity of apperception is a condition of there being experiences at all, not a relation among items that could exist without it. And in practical reason he went further than theory allows: as agents we must think of ourselves as free and accountable, and so as persisting. Christine Korsgaard's reply to Parfit is a modern version of this move.
| Kant | Parfit | |
|---|---|---|
| What is a person? | For experience, a unity of apperception, the "I think" that can accompany all my representations; in itself, unknown. | Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events. |
| What makes you the same person over time? | Theoretical reason cannot say. The identity of consciousness over time does not prove the identity of a substance. | Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching. |
| Is identity what matters? | Theoretically undecidable. Practically, as agents, we must regard ourselves as one and responsible. | No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division. |
| One of you, or many? | The unity of consciousness requires one "I" for each experience; whether one substance underlies it, we cannot know. | Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty. |