Oxford, born 1953

David Deutsch

What makes something a person? David Deutsch's answer is not a soul, a species or a body, but a capacity: to create new explanations of anything at all. Humans are the only known examples, and they need not be the last.

An engraved title page: a printing press stands under a cartouche reading Nova Reperta, between a map of the Americas and a compass rose, with other inventions scattered on the ground below
Jan van der Straet (Stradanus), title page of Nova Reperta, engraved and published in Antwerp, c. 1590. "New discoveries": the series that follows celebrates America, the compass, printing, gunpowder, the clock and more. Each is an explanation put to work, by people.Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The view

In The Beginning of Infinity (2011), David Deutsch argues that people are universal explainers. An explanation is an account of what is there and how it works, created by conjecture and tested by criticism. Most things in the universe, from rocks to bacteria, create no explanations at all. Biological evolution creates knowledge, in genes, but only of a limited kind. People can create explanations of anything that can be explained. Humans are the only known examples.

The difference between us and other animals is not one of degree but a jump to universality, his name for what happens when a system that has been improving in small steps suddenly becomes able to do everything of its kind. The alphabet, which can spell any word, is one example; the universal computer, which can be programmed to compute anything computable, is another. A universal explainer is the same jump, made in the domain of knowledge.

The argument

Two consequences follow, which Deutsch develops in the chapters "The Jump to Universality" and "Artificial Creativity". First, because the laws of physics allow any physical process to be simulated by a universal computer, the processes that make a human mind can be simulated too. So artificial general intelligence must be possible, and the obstacle to building it is not hardware but our lack of an explanation of creativity. Second, an AGI would be a person, with the same moral standing as any other, whatever it is made of. What makes something a person is the program, not the material that runs it.

Deutsch's classification: the line that matters is between limited and universal, not between flesh and silicon.

Where he meets Parfit

Deutsch, like Parfit, defines persons by what they can do, not what they are made of, and both hold that a person could in principle be carried by other matter. His multiverse is also where Parfit's division happens in fact: in The Fabric of Reality (1997) and The Beginning of Infinity he describes many instances of each of us, fungible until quantum outcomes differentiate them. The Many of you page builds on both.

Where he parts from Parfit

Deutsch has written no theory of personal identity. He does not say what makes a person the same over time, or whether identity is what matters, and this site attributes no view on either to him. His account answers a different question from Parfit's, and the two fit together: Deutsch says what kind of thing a person is, Parfit what carries one forward. Deutsch has central or thinker pages on the sister sites: the reality, knowledge, mind and free will sites.

Deutsch and Parfit side by side
DeutschParfit
What is a person?A universal explainer: an entity that can create any explanation there is, by conjecture and criticism.Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
What makes you the same person over time?Deutsch offers no theory of personal identity over time, and the site attributes none to him.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.
Is identity what matters?Not addressed. What he stresses is what a person can do, not what keeps one the same.No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.
One of you, or many?Many. In the multiverse there are fungible instances of each of us, which become different when quantum outcomes are recorded.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.

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Further reading