Harvard, born 1952

Christine Korsgaard

You have one body and must act with it, one way or another. Christine Korsgaard argues that this, not any metaphysical fact, is what makes you one person: you are unified because you must act.

A peasant striding down a darkening hillside, flinging seed from a bag slung across his body, crows wheeling behind him
Jean-François Millet, The Sower, 1850. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Sowing now for a harvest months away: an agent's plan holds the seasons of a life together.Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The view

In "Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit" (1989), Christine Korsgaard granted much of Parfit's metaphysics and denied that it settled anything practical. Suppose that a person is, metaphysically, a series of experiences linked by R, with no further fact. It does not follow that I should regard my future as I regard another's. For I am not only a subject of experiences; I am an agent, and agency has its own unity.

The unity at a time comes first. I have one body and must act with it, so I must reach a decision, even when my desires conflict. I cannot act as two. The unity over time follows: most of what I want to do takes time, careers, friendships, projects, and to pursue them I must regard myself as one agent who began them and will finish them. This unity is not found by introspection or metaphysics. It is made, by the standpoint I must take up whenever I deliberate.

The argument

Korsgaard turned Parfit's divided minds against him. Even split-brain patients act, in daily life, as one person, because they have one body to act with. And Parfit's exam case shows the same thing in reverse: the two streams agree in advance on a plan, and reunite to carry it out. What makes them one is not a metaphysical fact but a shared practical point of view. On her later account, in The Sources of Normativity (1996), we each have a practical identity, a description under which we value ourselves, and our reasons flow from it.

One body, one action. To act at all, the conflicting parts must be governed by a single point of view.

Where she meets Parfit

Korsgaard accepts much of Parfit's reductionism as metaphysics. She agrees that there is no Cartesian ego, and that the puzzle cases show that the deep further fact is an illusion. Her disagreement is about what follows for how we should live.

Where she parts from Parfit

Parfit thought Reductionism weakens the claims of self-interest and makes the boundaries between persons less important. Korsgaard argues that the practical standpoint restores them. Deliberating, I must treat my future self as myself, not as someone else whose interests I happen to share. Her reply is a modern form of Kant's move: what theoretical reason cannot establish, practical reason requires.

Korsgaard and Parfit side by side
KorsgaardParfit
What is a person?An agent: a being that must deliberate and choose, and so must regard itself as the author of its actions.Nothing over and above a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events.
What makes you the same person over time?Practical unity: the standpoint of an agent pursuing plans over time, which we construct rather than discover.Relation R, psychological connectedness and continuity, holding in one line without branching.
Is identity what matters?Yes, practically. Whatever the metaphysics, an agent cannot treat its own future as just another person's.No. What matters is Relation R, which can hold without identity, as in division.
One of you, or many?One agent per body, by practical necessity; two minds in one head must still act as one.Normally one, but the concept fails when R branches; then the question may be empty.

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Further reading